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Abstract
We perform an economic analysis of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), modeling the strategic interaction between the Bureau of Customs and Border Protec-
tion (CBP) and trading ﬁrms as a Stackelberg game. We characterize the unique equilibrium
outcome and perform comparative statics. We provide insights relevant to policy planners and
to private sector trading ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that, for a given level of inspection capacity, implementation of C-TPAT results in
a Pareto reduction in costs. The membership level increases as the environment becomes riskier
but is unaﬀected by changes in inspection capacity. The latter result implies that the program
structure should be stable, and it indicates that it may be possible to decouple inspection
problems across ports. At the same time, because CBP cannot base C-TPAT agreements upon
observed outcomes (terrorist incidents) the program’s equilibrium does not achieve an economic
First Best.
1 Introduction
The volume and value of containerized goods entering the US through ports is enormous, and
it continues to grow.1 In 2004, $423 billion in goods entered the US in 15.8 million containers
(GAO 2007-a). Almost half of the $2 trillion in international goods transported through the US in
2000 was shipped in containers, and the international tonnage of trade through the US is expected
to double by 2020 (Greenberg et al. 2006).
Given the large numbers and value of containers entering US ports each year, concern about
their use by terrorists is high. Only one of millions of containers need be compromised to cost the
1A container is a uniform, sealed, reusable metal box (generally 20 or 40 feet in length) in which goods are shipped
by vessel, rail, or truck.
1US billions of dollars in lost trade and endanger thousands of lives. For instance, Gerencser et al.
(2003) estimate the economic losses stemming from a so-called “dirty bomb” that disrupts a port
to be $58 billion.2 Abt (2003) estimates that the detonation of a nuclear device in a port may lead
to losses in the range of $55 - 220 billion. Abt et al. (2003) estimate the economic losses from a
similar bio-terrorist attack to be in the range of $15 - 40 billion.
The federal Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for ensuring the
security of US ports against these types of attacks. To promote port security, CBP uses risk
management techniques to screen containerized cargo for potential anomalies. Its Automated
Targeting System (ATS) assigns a risk score to each container entering US waters and, based
on these scores, a fraction of incoming containers is marked for rigorous inspection (GAO 2004).
Containers may be subject to inspection at the port of origin (embarkation), outside the US, as
well as at the port of entry (debarkation) into the US. The focus of this paper is the latter.
CBP is charged with securing ports with least possible hindrance to commerce. There are
inherent economic tradeoﬀs between the frequency and rigor with which containers can be inspected
and the speed with which they can be turned around. The more containers inspected, and the more
time spent inspecting each container, the smaller the probability of a hazard, such as a bomb or
biological weapon, going undetected. But as the number of containers subject to detailed inspection
increases, the resulting congestion can also be detrimental to trade. In the short run, unanticipated
container delays can cause costly supply-chain disruptions. For example, Martonosi et al. (2006)
estimate the cost of delay per day to approach 0.5% of the value of a container. Even in the long
run, when inspection-induced delays can be anticipated, the extra pipeline inventory required to
accommodate delays can be costly. For example, given an annual ﬂow of $423 billion in goods, a
day of pipeline inventory is worth $1.16 billion. At a cost of capital of 15%, that day of pipeline
inventory would, in turn require $174 million per year to ﬁnance.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a federal initiative intended to in-
duce private companies to help address this trade-oﬀ. Companies that join C-TPAT agree to take
speciﬁc steps that improve the security of the containers they ship to US ports (GAO 2004). By
improving the risk proﬁle of these containers, CBP aims to reduce the number of containers it needs
to inspect and, at the same time, reduce the overall level of terrorism-related risks associated with
containers entering the US. Thus, members of C-TPAT bear out-of-pocket security expenses that
allow CBP to reduce costs and risks associated with container hazards and inspections.
2A dirty bomb, also called a “radiological dispersal device” (RDD), combines a conventional explosive, such as
dynamite, with radioactive material. When the conventional explosive detonates, it disperses the radioactive material,
and the dispersion contaminates the surrounding area.
2C-TPAT membership is voluntary, and a central economic incentive for joining the program is
the reduction in inspection burden to which members are entitled (C-TPAT Strategic Plan 2004).
Another (more speculative) beneﬁt is the prospect that, in the event of a disaster, C-TPAT members
would be “at the head of the line” once the target port resumed operations.
For many companies, the program’s beneﬁts appear to outweigh its costs, and more than 7,000
companies have joined C-TPAT since its inception in November, 2001 (Basham 2007). A survey
of 1,240 C-TPAT members, conducted by University of Virginia on behalf of CBP, found that the
respondents spent, on an average, about $54,000 per year in compliance costs as compared to about
$25,000 in security-related expenditure during the last full year before joining C-TPAT (American
Shipper 2007). The survey also found that about 39% of the ﬁrms experienced a reduction in
inspection frequency, while 53% reported no change. CBP is encouraged by these results because
it has quadrupled inspection levels since September 11, 2001.
At the same time, both trade magazines and federal-government reviews of C-TPAT cite widespread
dissatisfaction with the program (Keane 2005, GAO 2005). These reviews consistently cite two sets
of concerns: 1) the beneﬁts to participating members have not been clearly outlined; and 2) eﬀective
validation of security proﬁles, and regular audit of members to ensure compliance, is lacking.
Even more alarming is the apparent lack of rigor with which security inspections themselves can
be conducted. Laxity in inspections have resulted in a breach in border security more than once.
For example, on two occasions journalists from ABC News managed to ship nuclear material in
cargo containers into the US (Kurtz 2003). Similarly, the GAO reports that its investigators have
twice used forged documents to import radioactive material through inland borders (GAO 2006-a).
A common feature in the above lapses is the inadequacy of the inspection procedures followed.
Human skill and procedural robustness are essential complements to technological sophistication
in detecting terrorist inﬁltration. This point is emphasized in Huizenga (2005).
The goal of this paper is to provide a modeling framework to understand the economic trade-oﬀs
embedded in container-inspection decisions and to use this framework to analyze policy initiatives
such as C-TPAT. For a private company there exists a trade-oﬀ between the cost of compliance with
C-TPAT and the beneﬁt of reduced congestion costs associated with the inspection of its containers.
The US government faces a trade-oﬀ, between the security beneﬁt derived from increased inspection
of incoming containers and the adverse impact of the resulting congestion. The government must
also consider the ﬁnancial burden stemming from the need for additional security infrastructure.
We model the interaction between CBP and the trading ﬁrms as a Stackelberg game, using the
Principal-Agent framework. CBP (the principal) acts as the leader and the trading ﬁrms (agents)
3are followers. CBP ﬁrst sets the levels of inspection frequency and intensity (rigor), as well as
parameters for the audit of members. The trading ﬁrms, then decide whether or not to join C-
TPAT, based on their idiosyncratic costs of complying with the security guidelines laid out in the
program.
Elementary considerations within our modeling approach imply that the improved risk proﬁle of
C-TPAT members results in a lower inspection frequency in comparison to that of non-members.
They also show how members’ potential for Moral Hazard (shirking) requires CBP to audit them
for compliance.
Analysis of the model results in a unique equilibrium outcome, with the following properties:
• There is a threshold cost of compliance which separates ﬁrms that join C-TPAT from those
that do not.
• The intensity with which containers are inspected induces the maximum allowable level of
system congestion.
• The expected cost to member ﬁrms, due to security measures under C-TPAT, varies with
their ﬁrm-speciﬁc compliance-costs, and non-members end up with a higher expected cost
than members.
• For any given (ﬁxed) level of inspection capacity, implementation of C-TPAT results in greater
security (lower probability of a successful terrorist strike), than the base-case scenario, without
C-TPAT.
• For any given (ﬁxed) level of inspection capacity, implementation of C-TPAT results in a
Pareto reduction in the costs incurred by both CBP and trading ﬁrms, when compared with
the base-case scenario (without C-TPAT).
• Even though the trading ﬁrms are risk neutral, we ﬁnd that the potential to shirk on the part
of member ﬁrms results in a higher cost for CBP as well as the trading ﬁrms, as compared
to the case in which CBP can control the actions of the trading ﬁrms (First Best).
This last equilibrium result seems to contradict standard Principal-Agent theory, according to which
cost eﬃciency can be achieved, despite the potential for moral hazard, through the use of contracts
that use output quality as a signal for eﬀort, when the players are risk neutral. In our problem
setting, however, it does not make sense to contract on the quality of output, since “output” is the
occurrence of a terrorist incident. Thus, to observe eﬀort, CBP must resort to the costly audit of
agents, which results in ineﬃciency.
4Comparative statics show the following:
• As expected, an increase in inspection capacity results in increased security.
• The threshold cost of compliance, and hence the membership level of C-TPAT, remains un-
changed with changes in inspection capacity. This implies that CBP can structure the pro-
gram – and prospective members can make joining decisions – without concern for future
capacity/technology decisions. Thus, CBP should be able to communicate the beneﬁts of
C-TPAT membership without signiﬁcantly restricting its ability to modify the program in
the future.
• In contrast to the eﬀect of greater capacity, an improvement in the risk proﬁle of non-members,
or the quality of intelligence used to identify risky containers, will result in lower levels of
membership in C-TPAT. In essence, a safer environment will reduce the need for inspecting
containers, and thus reduce the beneﬁt from joining C-TPAT. Similarly, a degradation in the
risk proﬁle of member ﬁrms will also result in a lower membership in C-TPAT. It would also
lead to a lower level of security.
• Under certain suﬃcient conditions, an increase in the so called “deterrence threshold” (or,
equivalently, an increase in terrorists’ cost of carrying out an attack) results in greater mem-
bership and greater security.
Thus, we ﬁnd that, for a given level of inspection capacity, implementation of C-TPAT results in
a Pareto reduction in costs. Moreover, the membership level increases as the environment becomes
riskier, but it is unaﬀected by changes in inspection capacity. Not only does the latter result lend
stability to the program structure (as discussed earlier), but it also indicates that it may be possible
to decouple the multi-port problem, i.e., determine the optimal inspection policy for each port, in
isolation. This is because trading ﬁrms can make routing decisions for their container traﬃc, as
well as their decision to participate in C-TPAT or not, without regard to inter-port diﬀerences in
relative capacity. We discuss this further in Section 5.1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 describes a base-case scenario in port security, one without the option of joining C-TPAT.
Section 4 describes the main features of C-TPAT and their interaction with the container-inspection
policy followed by CBP. In addition, it describes the principal-agent interactions between CBP and
the trading ﬁrms. This section also contains our equilibrium results. Comparative statics can be
found in Section 5. Finally, we present a brief discussion of the general scope of our work in Section
6.
52 Literature Review
Government documents are a comprehensive source for background information on port-security
measures, such as C-TPAT, as well as inspection considerations related to border security. Details
on C-TPAT can be found in the C-TPAT Strategic Plan (2004). More documents are available on
CBP’s website.3 A comprehensive treatment of inspection issues at the various ports of entry into
the US can be found in Wasem et al. (2004). Government Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) reports on
maritime security (GAO 2004, GAO 2005, GAO 2006-a, GAO 2006-b) highlight the implementation
challenges associated with C-TPAT.
Issues relating to port security and container inspections lie in the overlap between public policy
and operations management, and researchers from both sides have contributed to the growing
literature in the ﬁeld. Some examples of policy work on this issue are Greenberg et al. (2006),
Martonosi et al. (2006), and Boske (2006). Examples of the OM approach can be found in Wein et
al. (2007) and Wein et al. (2006). Our work is closest in spirit to the latter.
Wein et al. (2006) develop and analyze a mathematical model of the entire multi-layered port-
security system. The paper takes a computational approach to evaluating CBP’s optimal inspection
strategy when faced with the risk of importation of illicit nuclear material into the US. Its aim is
to prescribe the level of investment (in radiation detection equipment and personnel) required to
meet a safety target, given a predeﬁned ﬂow of containers to be inspected.
In contrast, ours is an analytical treatment of the strategic interaction – between CBP and
trading ﬁrms – that generates the ﬂow of containers to be inspected. Our treatment is stylized and
at a higher level: it is not concerned with the speciﬁc details of the detection of nuclear threats,
and our results apply to a broad range of risks, including nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.
Our model has three key components: risk assessment, the eﬀectiveness of inspections, and the
resulting impact on the economics of terrorist activity. We discuss each in turn.
CBP performs a risk assessment for terrorist threats for the entire population of incoming
containers, and assigns a risk score to each individual container, using manifest information as well
as targeting rules that are based on strategic intelligence and anomalies (GAO 2004, Wasem et
al. 2004, Bettge 2006). In our model, the risk score is analogous to the conditional probability
that a container would not be identiﬁed as risky, given it had in fact been inﬁltrated by terrorists.
Statistics has a rich tradition in screening and classiﬁcation methodology, and use of techniques
such as ROC, or receiver-operating curves (Fawcett 2006, Marshall and Olkin 1968). For a related
3www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial enforcement/ctpat/
6treatment in OM see Shumsky and Pinker (2003). Ours is also an example of a classiﬁcation
problem in which the risk score is the screening variable used to segment the container population
into a “high risk” and a “low risk” category.
Our model also incorporates the idea of a deterrence threshold, a critical value for a container’s
conditional probability of non-detection, below which the expected beneﬁt to terrorists is lower
than the expected cost of inﬁltration (Martonosi 2005, Martonosi and Barnett 2006). Pinker (2007)
discusses the role of private and public “warnings” in creating deterrence. Containers with a risk
score below the deterrence threshold are not worth terrorists’ eﬀort to inﬁltrate and are considered
benign in the model. No restriction is imposed on the value of the deterrence threshold.
Containers with risk scores that fall above the deterrence threshold are inspected, and the
eﬀectiveness of a container inspection can be measured through the residual probability of risk. We
use a speed-accuracy-tradeoﬀ (SAT) function to associate the expected inspection time with CBP’s
capacity/technology choice and the residual risk. Literature on SAT functions includes McClelland
(1979), Ghylin et al. (2006) and Yuen et al. (2007).
Finally, we mention three related but distinct streams of literature. First is research on airline
and passenger security, in which passengers are the analogues of shipping containers. Some examples
from this stream include Martonosi (2005), Martonosi and Barnett (2006), Jacobson et al. (2006),
and Nikolaev et al. (2007). Second is more traditional work on the optimization of container-
terminal operations. Steenken et al. (2004) provides a comprehensive survey of this literature. Third
is the evolving body of work on managing supply chain disruptions. A few notable contributions
on this front include Kleindorfer and Saad (2005), Sheﬃ (2005), and Tomlin (2006).
3 Port Security and Congestion
In this section we lay out the key features of port security that are relevant to our analysis. We
also discuss the form of the container inspection policy and its impact on congestion at ports.
3.1 The Shipping and Inspection Process
The ﬂows of containers belonging to diﬀerent ﬁrms follow a similar pattern. After leaving the
shipper’s premises, containers are brought to the port of embarkation. From there, they are sent
on an ocean-going vessel which visits a US port of debarkation. At this port of debarkation, all
containers undergo some form of “passive” screening, a non-intrusive inspection which may include
neutron and gamma-ray radiation monitoring. We refer to this stage as primary inspection. Based
7on prior information on the source and handling of the container, as well as the results of these
tests, a fraction of these containers is tagged by CBP for more intensive, secondary inspection.
Secondary inspection can include active tests, such as gamma and x-ray radiography, and possible
devanning of the container for a comprehensive manual inspection. For more details on inspection
strategies see Wein et al. (2006). Finally, when a container is determined to be safe, it is allowed
into the country.
3.2 Risk Scoring and Container Inspection Policy
CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) uses manifest information and targeting rules (based
on expert judgment and historical shipment information) to detect which containers are “high risk”
and should be scrutinized thoroughly at the port of entry. We model the ATS risk score as the
conditional probability that, given a container conceals terrorist weapons, it would escape detection
by security precautions in place up through the primary inspection at the port of debarkation:
P[no alarm threat]. If primary inspection does not trigger an alarm and a container’s ATS score
falls below some threshold, then the container is not inspected further. If, however, one of these
conditions does not hold, then CBP tags the container for more intensive secondary inspection.
We posit that there exists a so-called “deterrence threshold” for these ATS-generated risk scores.
For containers with a risk score below the deterrence threshold, the probability that a compromised
container avoids detection is low enough that the cost to terrorists of trying to inﬁltrate the container
is greater than the expected beneﬁt. Thus, these containers do not provide terrorists with a high
enough chance of success to make the eﬀort of introducing a hazard into them worthwhile. In turn,
they are considered to be without threat. (For details on this approach, see Chapter 3 in Martonosi
(2005), and Martonosi and Barnett (2006).)
Figure 1 pictures an example of the CDF of risk scores, Gn(x), with x ∈ [0,1]. We denote the
associated density function as gn(x). We also denote the deterrence threshold by the symbol L.
Here, the subscript “n” is used to signify ﬁrms that are not members of C-TPAT. In this
section, which analyzes a “base case” without C-TPAT, all ﬁrms are non-members. In Section 4
we distinguish members from non-members by using the subscript “m.”
We represent the fraction of containers selected for secondary inspection by θn, and observe that
θn = 1 − Gn(L).
CBP’s policy is to inspect 100% of “high risk” containers (Bonner 2003). In the context of our
8Gn(x) = fraction of containers for which P{false negative} ≤ x
x = P{container has a false negative}
L
Gn(L)
1
1
0
0
Figure 1: Sample CDF for risk scores.
model, this fraction of high risk containers equals θn.
3.3 Time spent in secondary inspection of containers
Huizenga (2005) notes that, even though current technology is quite eﬀective in detecting most
nuclear material, it is less than assuring when it comes to detecting certain conﬁgurations of shielded
highly-enriched uranium. The diversity in the nuclear threat, in conjunction with often hard-to-
detect threats from chemical and biological weapons, requires CBP to determine not only which
containers to inspect, but also the rigor of the inspection process for containers identiﬁed as risky.
The eﬀectiveness of inspections depends on the time and care with which they are conducted.
As we noted in the introduction, Kurtz (2003) and GAO (2006-a) report instances in which lax
inspections allowed nuclear materials to be clandestinely slipped into the US. USA TODAY (2007)
and Ghylin et al. (2006) note analogous problems with the screening of passengers and baggage at
airports.
For containers, the time required for secondary inspections can range widely. For example, the
time needed to properly interpret x-ray images may vary. More signiﬁcantly, the rigor with which
a container is “devanned” can extend broadly: from a cursory look inside the back doors, to a
more thorough emptying out of a center “aisle” through which inspectors move, to the removal of
all contents stored within the container, even to the opening and inspection of the cartons or ﬂats
that have been removed.
Thus, a key decision that CBP has to make is the extent or rigor of inspection of a “high risk”
9container, and the eﬀectiveness of an inspection can be measured through the residual probability
of a container harboring a risk. We use a speed-accuracy-tradeoﬀ (SAT) function to model the
expected inspection time as a function of capacity/technology choice and that risk:
S = ψ(ε,κ) + φ, (1)
where S is the time spent on a container’s secondary inspection, ε equals the residual probability
that there is a hazard that remains undetected after inspection, and κ represents the appropriately
scaled inspection capacity. The random variable, φ, has mean 0 and variance σ2, which captures
the randomness introduced by container-speciﬁc characteristics, such as the type of goods being
shipped and the quality of documentation of manifest information. From (1) we have E(S) = ψ,
and E(S2) = ψ2 + σ2.
We make three mild sets of assumptions concerning the form of ψ(ε,κ). First, time spent on
inspection is strictly decreasing in both the residual risk and capacity: ψε ≡ ∂ψ/∂ε < 0 and
ψκ ≡ ∂ψ/∂κ < 0. Second, for any ﬁnite capacity level, κ, we assume that ψ(1,κ) = 0 and
limε→0 ψ(ε,κ) = ∞. Finally, we assume that there exists some minimal level of rigor in the
inspection procedure; that is, there exists some ε0 < 1 such that 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0.
Remark 1 As an example, consider the following speciﬁc functional form for ψ:
S = −
lnε
κ
+ φ. (2)
This functional form satisﬁes the ﬁrst two of our assumptions. It also is consistent with the classic
model for SATs presented in McClelland (1979), as well as with recent higher-level models of speed-
accuracy tradeoﬀs used in the OM literature (see Yuen et al. (2007)) Similar tradeoﬀs are observed
by Ghylin et al. (2006) for the problem of passenger baggage screening.
3.4 Congestion due to secondary inspection
Let Λ denote the “raw” (or “base”) arrival rate of containers into a port. Given that containers
are marked for secondary inspection with probability θn, the resulting eﬀective arrival rate for
secondary inspection is λ = Λθn. We assume that the arrival process is Poisson and that the
time spent in secondary inspection is given by S, as determined by (1). We model the process of
10secondary inspection at the port as an M/G/1 queuing system with expected delay:
E(D) =
λE(S2)
2(1 − λE(S))
=
λ(ψ2 + σ2)
2(1 − λψ)
. (3)
The queuing discipline followed is ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served.
The M/G/1 queuing model is an approximation of the real world, where multiple stations might
process the containers tagged for secondary inspection. This assumption allows us to include an
analytically tractable expression for expected delay within our broader economic analysis. Fur-
thermore, in the current context – in which a small number of servers is highly utilized – the
single-server assumption should be reasonable. (For example, see Kollerstrom (1974) and also
Chapter 11, Section 10 in Wolﬀ (1989).)
Suppose that ﬁrm i incurs an idiosyncratic per-container delay cost di per unit of time, and
that the average dollar margin per container is ri for ﬁrm i. Then we assume that waiting cost per
dollar of surplus, w = di/ri, is a constant, for all i. To the extent that delay costs are driven by
the cost of capital (and other value-driven factors) such a constant ratio is a natural assumption.
For example, see Martonosi et al. (2006).
3.5 Analysis of the Base Case
Containers come into a port at arrival rate Λ and are picked up for secondary inspection at a rate
Λθn. CBP decides on the residual risk left in the containers post secondary inspection, εb. (Here
the subscript “b” denotes Base Case.) We assume initially that inspection capacity, κ, is ﬁxed
so that the policy choice for CBP is a value of residual risk, εb. The residual risk then yields an
expected inspection time, ψ(εb,κ).
CBP’s objective is to minimize the expected losses due to terrorist threats in containers entering
a port. Let R represent the expected economic loss from a successful terrorist attack. Then the
per container expected cost to CBP is
OP = θnεbR. (4)
While this objective naturally leads CBP to make εb as small as possible, concern for the economic
viability of the trading ﬁrms that use the port prevent it from simply setting εb = 0.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i is willing to participate in ocean trade as long as, on a per container basis,
the expected cost incurred from inspection-induced congestion is less than its proﬁt margin ri, or a
11fraction (u) thereof: θndi(E(D) + E(S)) ≤ uri. Since di/ri = w, we can rewrite the inequality as:
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆, (IRb)
where ∆ ≡ u
wθn.
The above constraint acts as an upper bound on the expected system waiting time (delay plus
service time) for containers undergoing secondary inspection. Wein et al. (2006) models a service-
level constraint on port congestion in a related manner.
The eﬀective arrival rate at the secondary inspection facility is λ = Λθn. From (3) we see that
(IRb) requires that
λ(ψ2+σ2)
2(1−λψ) +ψ ≤ ∆, which implies λσ2 ≤ 2∆ must be satisﬁed as well. We assume
that this condition is met. Similarly (3), (IRb), and ∆ < ∞ imply that ρ ≡ λψ < 1. Thus, any
feasible solution will have a stable inspection queue. Finally, we note that the residual risk must
be a probability: εb ∈ [0,ε0].
So, the optimization problem faced by CBP is as follows:
min
εb
OP = min
εb
[θnεbR]
s.t.
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆ (IRb)
0 ≤ εb ≤ ε0 (FEASb)
This leads to our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 For λ ≡ Λθn and λσ2 ≤ 2∆, there exists a feasible solution to CBP’s optimization
problem in the Base Case, if and only if there exists some εb ≤ ε0 such that
ψ(εb,κ) ≤
(1 + λ∆) −
p
1 + λ2(∆2 + σ2)
λ
. (5)
In this case, there exists a unique optimal value, ε∗
b, which satisﬁes (5) with equality. Equivalently,
E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆.
Proof See Appendix A. 2
Condition (5) means that there exists enough inspection capacity at the port to feasibly exert some
12minimal possible rigor in examining “high risk” containers; that is, κ ≥ κ0, where κ0 solves
ψ(ε0,κ0) =
(1 + λ∆) −
p
1 + λ2(∆2 + σ2)
λ
(6)
for λ = Λθn. For example, κ0 might be the equipment and personnel required to just capture an
x-ray image of container contents, without time spent in careful interpretation of the image.
The intuition behind the result in Proposition 1 is straightforward. The objective function of
the principal is linear and strictly increasing in εb. Moreover, the left-hand side (LHS) of the (IRb)
constraint is monotonically decreasing in ε. Hence, CBP will reduce εb until the (IRb) constraint
is binding. The condition λσ2 ≤ 2∆ is necessary and suﬃcient for the mean service time to be
non-negative. The results of this Base Case serve as a benchmark with which to compare and
contrast the results of security scenario with C-TPAT, as described in Section 4.
4 C-TPAT
4.1 Background on C-TPAT
CBP asks C-TPAT members to ensure the integrity of their supply chain security practices and to
communicate and verify the security practices of their supply chain partners (GAO 2005). CBP
speciﬁes standards, such as infrastructure requirements and procedures to be followed while prepar-
ing a container for shipping. For example, a C-TPAT member may be required to secure its premises
with patrols and video surveillance, undertake an extensive exercise in risk assessment and take
remedial measures based on the results, use electronic tamper-proof seals on its containers, verify
the background of all employees and contractors working for it, and adhere to other guidelines in
the program.
4.1.1 C-TPAT and Security-Related Eﬀort
Whether or not a ﬁrm joins C-TPAT, it may perform some due diligence of its own accord, to
prevent pilferage, ensure visibility of the container during its journey to its destination, or facilitate
reconciliation of contents upon delivery. To ensure compliance with C-TPAT guidelines a ﬁrm may
need to exert additional eﬀort. We normalize the eﬀort exerted by a non-member ﬁrm to be 0. We
deﬁne γi ∈ [0,∞) to be the extra cost per container that ﬁrm i incurs to comply with C-TPAT
guidelines.
134.1.2 Risk Proﬁle of Members
As in Section 3, the CDFs Gm(x) and Gn(x) describe the distribution of risk scores in the container
populations of C-TPAT members and non-members, respectively. The distribution Gn(x) is the
same as that in the Base Case. We assume that the two CDFs are diﬀerentiable on (L,1), with
corresponding density functions gm(x) and gn(x).4
Given C-TPAT’s aim of motivating companies to reduce container risk, we expect the distribu-
tion of Gm and Gn to diﬀer, and we assume that Gm(x) > Gn(x), for all x ∈ [0,1). This relationship
is referred to as a strict First Order Stochastic Dominance ordering between the two distributions
(Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994).
Remark 2 In Appendix C we relax the assumption that all non-members have the same risk proﬁle
by allowing for multiple types of risk proﬁles among non-members. We ﬁnd that the key insights of
our analysis do not change.
Whether or not a ﬁrm joins C-TPAT, the ﬂow of its containers follows a similar pattern. θm
represents the fraction of a C-TPAT member’s (“m” for members) containers that undergo more
intensive secondary inspection. Likewise θn represents the fraction of a non-member’s (“n” for
non-members) containers that are tagged for secondary inspection. The values of θm and θn are
functions of the deterrence threshold at which CBP begins secondary inspection, as well as the
fraction of member and non-member traﬃc that falls above that threshold. We see that:
θm = 1 − Gm(L) and θn = 1 − Gn(L)
Lemma 1 The frequency of container inspection for members is strictly lower than that of non-
members; i.e., θm < θn.
Proof This follows immediately from the FOSD relationship between Gm(·) and Gn(·), which
assumes that Gm(L) > Gn(L). 2
Thus, by joining C-TPAT, a ﬁrm improves its risk proﬁle, and the improvement leads to a reduction
in the fraction of its containers that undergo secondary inspection. The savings associated with
this reduction are an important incentive to join.
4Recall that L is the deterrence threshold for the risk scores.
144.1.3 Audit of Members
To prevent C-TPAT members from shirking (i.e., not exerting the extra security eﬀort required of
members), CBP may conduct an audit of member ﬁrms. We use the term audit in the sense of an
exercise that is undertaken on an ongoing basis to assure compliance with C-TPAT requirements.
The audit determines whether or not the guidelines laid out in C-TPAT are being diligently fol-
lowed. Use of damaged electronic container seals, use of contract labor without background checks,
and absence of video surveillance at facilities are examples of the types of lapses that might be
encountered during an audit. We assume that, once an audit has been undertaken, it is possible to
determine with certainty whether or not a ﬁrm has shirked.
CBP audits member ﬁrms with an annual relative frequency, q, and it then imposes a penalty
if a deviation is discovered. The audit frequency can be thought of as the fraction of C-TPAT
members that are audited in any given time period. We denote the per-container cost of auditing a
member ﬁrm i as ci(q), with c0
i(q) ≥ 0. For example, a ﬁrm with a per-period volume of container
traﬃc, Vi, incurs an expected cost of audit = qci(q)Vi, which translates to a per-container expected
cost = qci(q). Similarly, we let Pi represent the per-container allocation of the penalty assessed
should ﬁrm i be found to be shirking. This allows us to account for all costs on a per-container
basis.
We model audit costs as being borne by trading ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, the SAFE Port Act
(2006) has mandated a pilot for a third-party audit program. Under this scheme, CBP-authorized
third-party auditors (with appropriate access rights and training) conduct the audit, while the
C-TPAT participant itself pays for the audit.
Such a third-party scheme is attractive to CBP for two reasons. First, with an increasing number
of ﬁrms signing up for C-TPAT, CBP is falling short of staﬀ required to eﬀectively validate the
membership and later audit ﬁrms (GAO 2005).5 Second, CBP auditors do not have access to
certain trade lanes in the international supply chain, for political and sovereignty reasons. Notable
among the countries with such restrictions is China. CBP launched its pilot program for third-party
audits in June 2007 (Basham 2007).6
Third-party audits result in an expected (per-container) cost of qci(q) for member ﬁrms in
addition to the cost of compliance, γi. For CBP, q and Pi represent policy variables. The natural
domain for q is [0,1], and we assume 0 ≤ Pi ≤ Bi for some Bi < ∞. A reasonable upper bound
for Pi might be the per-container gain that accrues to ﬁrm i by joining C-TPAT. We discuss both
5In CBP’s parlance “revalidation” of C-TPAT membership is equivalent to an audit, as described in this paper.
6Similar third-party audit mechanisms have been used successfully in other contexts such as the promotion of
industrial safety and enforcing environmental regulations (Kunreuther et al. 2002).
15q and Pi in further detail, below.
4.2 A Principal-Agent model of C-TPAT
We model the interaction between CBP and the trading ﬁrms as a Stackelberg game in which CBP
(the principal) acts as the leader and the trading ﬁrms (agents) are followers. Both CBP and the
trading ﬁrms are assumed to be risk neutral.
CBP ﬁrst decides on the intensity of secondary inspections, ε, and the audit parameter q. It then
oﬀers the contract {q,Pi,ε,θm} to members and {ε,θn} to non-members who use the port facilities.
Firms decide whether or not to join C-TPAT, based on their respective costs of compliance and the
expected congestion costs due to secondary inspection. Once ﬁrms have decided whether or not
to join C-TPAT, members are expected to comply with the security-related guidelines prescribed
in the agreement. A pictorial representation of the sequence of events is presented in the Figure 2
below.
AGENTS / SHIPPERS
Firms Choose 
Contracts
from {m,n}
PRINCIPAL / CBP
CBP Sets Contract
Parameters
q, Pi, θm, θn, ψ
CBP Offers
Contracts
{m, n}
Members Incur Costs
γi, qci(q), θmdi(E[D]+ ψ)
Non‐members Incur Costs
θndi(E[D]+ ψ)
CBP Incurs Costs
[F(αt)θm +  (1‐F(αt))θn]εR
Figure 2: The dynamics of the principal-agent Stackelberg game.
4.2.1 Agent’s Problem
The decision of whether or not to join C-TPAT is largely governed by the agents’ cost of compliance
with the program. Firms with cost of compliance γi are faced with two choices: either sign up for C-
TPAT at an expected per-container expense γi +qci(q) and experience an expected system waiting
time of E(D) + E(S) with probability θm, or remain a non-member and experience an expected
wait of E(D) + E(S) with a higher probability, θn > θm. Mathematically speaking, the condition
16that must be satisﬁed for a ﬁrm to sign up for C-TPAT is:
γi + qci(q) + θmdi(E(D) + E(S)) ≤ θndi(E(D) + E(S)). (7)
Observe that the expected delay, E(D), is the same on both sides of the inequality. Implicitly,
we are assuming that each ﬁrm is an inﬁnitesimal player, whose individual decisions do not impact
the overall congestion levels in the system. This assumption is similar in spirit to the treatment in
a Wardrop Equilibrium (Altman et al. 2006).
Recalling that the dollar value of proﬁt margin on a container is ri for ﬁrm i, we now deﬁne
α(q) ≡ (γi + qci(q))/ri, as member i’s cost of compliance per dollar of surplus, or simply the
compliance cost. For γi ∈ [0,∞) we see that α(q) ∈ [
qci(q)
ri ,∞). For ﬁxed q, we can also deﬁne the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(α) to be the fraction of the total volume of containers
shipped to the US which come from ﬁrms with a compliance cost no more than α. We assume
that for any ﬁxed q, F(α) is diﬀerentiable everywhere, and dF(α) = f(α)dα represents the relative
likelihood that a container comes from a ﬁrm with compliance cost α. Implicit here, again, is
the assumption that each ﬁrm contributes an inﬁnitesimal amount to the cumulative volume of
container trade.
For a given E(D), let αt denote a threshold compliance cost (‘t’ for threshold), below which
(7) is satisﬁed and above which it is not. In turn, for a given αt, the fraction of C-TPAT certiﬁed
containers is F(αt), which yields the eﬀective arrival rate at the secondary-inspection queue:
λ = Λ[F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn]. (8)
Substituting this value of λ into (3) yields the corresponding expression for expected delay, E(D).
Of course, as described above, the deﬁnitions of αt and E(D) are circular, since each depends
on the other. Nevertheless, it is not diﬃcult to show that, for given q and ε, these two equilibrium
quantities are well deﬁned.
Proposition 2 For any choice of q and ε, the threshold value of the cost of compliance is given by
αt = (θn − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)). (9)
The solution to this equation exists and is unique.
Proof See Appendix A. 2
174.2.2 The Principal’s Problem
The principal tries to minimize the expected cost of a disaster. For a threshold compliance-cost
value of αt, the principal’s objective is given by:
min
q,Pi,ε
OP = min
q,Pi,ε
[F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn]εR. (10)
The solution to the principal’s problem should be such that it provides the appropriate incentives
for the agents to participate without shirking.
Participation Constraint for Agents
The participation constraint for non-members remains the same as described in condition (IRb)
in the Base Case. Satisfying (IRb) is also suﬃcient to ensure participation of member ﬁrms, as is
apparent from (7).
Incentive-Compatibility Constraint for Agents
A ﬁrm that has signed up for membership in C-TPAT may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to shirk by not putting
in the eﬀort required for compliance with C-TPAT guidelines while, at the same time, continuing
to enjoy reduced congestion costs aﬀorded to members only.
An incentive compatibility constraint ensures that such a situation does not arise. The principal
can use audit as a means to achieve incentive compatibility: a member ﬁrm i which fails an audit
is penalized an amount Pi, which is bounded above by some Bi < ∞.
Typically the upper bound, Bi, may be set to the beneﬁt accruing to the participating ﬁrm from
joining C-TPAT. This captures the idea that the penalty cannot be larger than the non-compliant
agent’s beneﬁt from its false announcement. (See page 123 in Laﬀont and Martimort (2001).) We
model the upper bound as a constant multiple, β (≥ 1), of the beneﬁt from non-compliance minus
the cost of the audit itself. Thus, for α(q) ∈ [0,αt], where α(q) = (γi + qci(q))/ri, condition (7)
implies that for each member ﬁrm i:
γi+qci(q)+θmdi(E(D)+E(S)) ≤ (1−q)[θmdi(E(D)+E(S))]+q[θndi(E(D)+E(S))+ci(q)+Pi],
(11)
where:
Pi ≤ Bi = β(θn − θm)di(E(D) + E(S)) − ci(q). (12)
We assume that the cost of audit is small enough so that Bi ≥ 0. Dividing (11) by ri, we observe
that, without audit, q ≡ 0 and (11) can be satisﬁed only for α = 0. Thus, without some form of
audit (or analogous mechanism), CBP cannot prevent shirking among member ﬁrms.
18In fact, CBP has an incentive to make the audit penalty, Pi, as large as possible. To see this, ﬁrst
note that an increase in Pi allows the inequality (11) to be satisﬁed for a smaller q, and, in turn,
a lower cost ci(q). Since, in equilibrium, the agent incurs the expected audit cost qci(q), but not
the penalty Pi, any given agent would want q to be as small as possible. Second, observe that from
Proposition 2 we also know that the threshold compliance cost, αt, is independent of the choice of
q. Recalling that each trading ﬁrm has α(q) ≡ (γi+qci(q))/ri, we see that a reduction in q therefore
increases participation in C-TPAT. Finally, from (10) and the fact that θm < θn we know that, for
any given ε, CBP minimizes its expected costs by maximizing participation in C-TPAT. Therefore,
CBP should minimize q to lower the compliance cost of trading ﬁrms, maximize participation, and
minimize its expected costs.
Thus, at optimum Pi will achieve its upper bound Bi. In the economics literature, this is known
as the principle of maximal punishment. (See pages 121-126 in Laﬀont and Martimort (2001).)
Indeed, a ﬁnite upper bound Bi is required to make the audit mechanism reasonable, lest CBP
impose an inﬁnite penalty with probability zero.
Using (9), (11) and (12) to simplify the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint, we obtain:
γi + qci(q)
ri
≡ α(q) ≤ q(1 + β)αt(q) ∀α(q) ≤ αt(q). (IC)
In turn, we have:
Proposition 3 In the Stackelberg game between CBP and trading ﬁrms, the optimal fraction of
members to be audited is:
q∗ =
1
1 + β
if αt(q∗) > 0; q∗ = 0 if αt(q∗) = 0.
Proof See Appendix A. 2
Proposition 3 implies that the value of q∗ is independent of the choice of ε. Thus, CBP can ﬁx q∗ and
then optimize over ε alone. Also, given q∗, we have α ≡ (γi +q∗ci(q∗))/ri, and the compliance-cost
distribution function F(α) is well deﬁned.
Proposition 3 also provides insight into the eﬀectiveness of CBP’s current audit practises. For
example, suppose β = 1, so that the penalty for shirking equals the expected beneﬁt from joining
the program. This implies that q∗ = 0.5, in which case a 50% chance of audit is optimal. Note that
β = 1 considers only reductions in average delay costs in program beneﬁts, ignoring the value of
being “ﬁrst in line” to resume trade, in the event of disruption. These other beneﬁts could inﬂate
19the eﬀective penalty for failing an audit, and hence lower the audit requirements further.
Thus, the optimization problem faced by the principal is as follows:
min
ε
OP = min
ε
[F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn]εR
s.t.
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆ (IR)
0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0, (FEAS)
and we can provide a sharp characterization of the equilibrium behavior that C-TPAT induces.
Recall the deﬁnition of κ0 from (6).
Proposition 4 Suppose Λθnσ2 ≤ 2∆ and κ ≥ κ0. Then the Stackelberg game between CBP and
trading ﬁrms has the following unique pure strategy equilibrium.
i) The equilibrium system wait time for containers undergoing secondary inspection is equal to
its upper bound, i.e., E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆.
ii) The equilibrium value of expected secondary inspection time is
ψ(ε∗,κ) =
(1 + λ∆) −
p
1 + λ2(∆2 + σ2)
λ
. (13)
Proof See Appendix A. 2
Part (i) shows that, as in the Base Case, CBP will increase the intensity of inspection until the
point at which the participation constraint is binding. As opposed to the Base Case, however, this
result is not obvious from an a priori look at the principal’s objective function, because it is hard
to say how the membership level, αt, will change as a function of the intensity of inspection, ε.
From (9), we see that part (i) also implies that the threshold value of compliance cost is equal to
the reduction in congestion costs experienced by joining C-TPAT, i.e., α∗
t = (θn − θm)w∆. Firms
with a compliance cost lower than this threshold value will be left with a correspondingly greater
trade surplus.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 follows directly from (i) and (9). Observe that the expression of mean
service time is the same as that in the Base Case, but for a diﬀerent value of λ. This is because
the (IR) constraint is binding in both cases. Using (1) it is possible to recover the value of residual
risk, ε, for a given value of inspection capacity, κ.
20A direct application of Little’s Law to the results in Proposition 4 implies the following queue-
length estimate.
Corollary 1 The expression for expected number of containers in service or waiting in queue, ˆ L,
at the secondary inspection facility is:
ˆ L = λ(E(D) + E(S)) = Λ[F(α∗
t)θm + (1 − F(α∗
t))θn]∆
Such an estimate can help CBP to more reliably determine the required size of the inspection site
and hence is helpful in planning terminal layout. In Section 5, we will see that the result also
implies a useful insensitivity property.
Given the sharp characterizations of Propositions 1 and 4 we can directly compare the equilib-
rium of the Base Case to that under C-TPAT.
Proposition 5 For any given level of inspection capacity, κ, we ﬁnd that, as compared to the Base
Case, implementation of C-TPAT results in:
i) Greater security.
ii) Pareto reduction in both CBP’s and trading ﬁrms’ costs.
iii) Lower expected number of containers in service or waiting in queue at the secondary inspection
facility.
Proof See Appendix A. 2
From the results in Proposition 1 and Proposition 4, we know that the expression for the optimal
value of expected service time ψ is the same, but for the value of λ in the expression. For the Base
Case: λ = Λθn, while for the scenario with C-TPAT: λ = Λ[F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn] < Λθn for
αt > 0. In addition it can be veriﬁed that
dE(D)
dλ > 0. Hence, we conclude that E(D) is smaller for
the C-TPAT scenario.
We also know that at equilibrium the (IR) constraint is binding for both cases: E(D)+ψ = ∆.
It follows that the value of ψ is higher for the scenario with C-TPAT, for a given level of capacity,
κ. Since ψε < 0, we conclude that ε∗ ≤ ε∗
b.
Thus Proposition 5 conﬁrms that C-TPAT results in a cost-eﬃcient lowering of risk. That is,
a few dollars spent by the trading ﬁrms in complying with C-TPAT guidelines results in a higher
amount of savings, due to the reduced need to inspect containers.
21Since the (IR) constraint is binding in both scenarios, non-members are equally well oﬀ in both
cases. At the same time (7) implies that member ﬁrms are better oﬀ with C-TPAT than in the
Base Case. Thus, there is a Pareto improvement in costs, everyone stands to beneﬁt from the
implementation of C-TPAT.
Finally Corollary 1 shows that the average number of containers at the inspection facility will
be lower under C-TPAT, since the program lowers the eﬀective arrival rate for inspections. Some
larger ports, such as Los Angeles / Long Beach, suﬀer from limited availability of land. This result
is good news from their perspective.
4.3 Contrasting the C-TPAT Equilibrium with First Best
In a “First Best” economic solution CBP would be able to observe, without any cost, the security
eﬀort exerted by trading ﬁrms. In this case there would be no room for moral hazard.
An obvious question that arises is how does the optimal solution in Proposition 4 compare with
the First Best? The following proposition shows that, in fact, the two results diﬀer.
Proposition 6 As compared to the First-Best solution to the container security problem, the op-
timal implementation of C-TPAT, with moral hazard, results in:
i) Lower compliance with guidelines as laid out in C-TPAT, i.e., FFB(αt) ≥ F(αt),
ii) Lower security, i.e., εFB ≤ ε∗,
iii) Higher cost for both CBP and trading ﬁrms.
Proof See Appendix A. 2
The intuition for the above result is as follows. In the First-Best scenario there is no moral hazard
and hence no requirement for audit. In contrast, the C-TPAT scenario, which has the possibility
of moral hazard, requires audit and an expected compliance cost for trading ﬁrms of qci(q). But
from Proposition 2 we know that the threshold compliance cost in (9), αt, is independent of the
value of q and, hence, remains the same in both the C-TPAT and First-Best scenarios. Hence, the
presence of model hazard forces membership in C-TPAT to drop below that in First Best.
Using (8) we know that reduced membership results in higher arrival rate of containers to the
secondary inspection facility. Since the congestion constraint (IR) is binding in both scenarios, the
greater inspection burden allows for a lower average inspection time, leads to higher residual risk,
and ultimately a higher cost for CBP.
22Similarly, all ﬁrms are at least as well oﬀ under First Best. Those that are non members in
both scenarios incur the same equilibrium cost in both cases, as determined by the binding (IR)
constraint. Those that are members in the First-Best scenario, but change their decision in the
presence of audit, are worse oﬀ in the scenario with moral hazard. Firms that choose to be members
in both scenarios are worse oﬀ in the case with moral hazard, due to the higher compliance cost
induced by audit.
Thus, there is a “loss in eﬃciency” as a result of moving away from the First-Best scenario, even
though the players are risk neutral. This runs counter to standard results in Principal-Agent (P-A)
theory, since the agents are risk neutral.7
In the case of C-TPAT we observe this ineﬃciency because our problem setting does not allow
for inference of the agents’ eﬀorts by simply observing container characteristics, which precludes
contracts that make compensation contingent on output quality and could thereby induce First-
Best eﬀort. Moreover, the challenges associated with tracing outcomes – terrorism-related incidents
– back to the possibility of shirking preclude consideration of relational contracts in our problem
setting.
Finally, we note that the observed ineﬃciency could potentially be alleviated if CBP could
set a very large penalty, Pi, for failing an audit, and thus drive q∗ to zero, in the limit. (This
limit, therefore, achieves First Best.) However, ﬁrms have limited liability due to bankruptcy
considerations, making this an infeasible strategy.
5 Comparative Statics
Our model has some exogenous parameters, such as inspection capacity, κ; the risk distributions,
Gn(x) and Gm(x); and the deterrence threshold, L. In this section we characterize the impact of
varying these parameters on the equilibrium outcome.
5.1 Capacity
Installed inspection capacity is a crucial determinant of overall security in the containerized supply
chain. It can be thought of in terms of the number of customs inspectors available for container
inspections at ports, along with the technology infrastructure in place, such as x-ray and gamma-
ray scanners. Both more inspectors and better technology, which allows quicker and more precise
inspections, can enable lower inspection times.
7When agents are risk neutral, moral hazard typically does not impose transaction costs or other ineﬃciencies.
23While greater capacity can provide for greater security, it is expensive and a key decision CBP
must make is its capacity investment in port security. First, we analyze the sensitivity of our
optimal solution to the installed inspection capacity.
To get started, recall that ψκ < 0. Then we see that
Proposition 7 Greater capacity results in:
i) No change in the level of membership in C-TPAT; i.e.,
dα∗
t
dκ = 0.
ii) Enhanced security; i.e., dε∗
dκ ≤ 0.
iii) Reduced expected cost for CBP; i.e.,
dO∗
P
dκ ≤ 0.
Proof See Appendix B. 2
Part (i) of Proposition 7 shows that membership levels of C-TPAT do not change in response to
changes in inspection capacity. Recall from (9) that membership levels in C-TPAT, αt, are driven
by system congestion E(D) + E(S). As part (i) of Proposition 4 shows however, in equilibrium,
system congestion is driven to its upper bound, E(D∗)+E(S∗) = ∆, a constant that does not vary
with inspection capacity. Thus, greater capacity is used to promote more thorough inspections,
rather than less burdensome delays.
This result implies that the C-TPAT program enjoys two useful forms of insensitivity. First,
for prospective C-TPAT members, expected congestion costs due to inspection should be the same
across ports, even though these ports may have diﬀerent inspection capacities. Second, as inspection
capacity changes, either though increases in personnel or technological improvements, the level of
program membership should continue to remain relatively stable. This stability in membership
across ports and across time should enhance CBP’s ability implement C-TPAT.
Together with Corollary 1, this result also implies that, even as capacity varies, there should
not be a systematic change in the expected numbers of risky containers found at the inspection
facilities. Again, this suggests that requirements for physical space at inspection facilities will not
vary signiﬁcantly across ports or over time, with technological advances in inspection capability.
This stability is likely to be beneﬁcial from the point of view of policy planners and terminal
operators.
The results in part (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 7 conform to our intuition that greater inspec-
tion capacity results in the ability to induce greater security for the nation; and greater inspection
capacity will lead to lower incurred cost for CBP. Of course lower cost for CBP also follows from
24the fact that our model does not account for the cost associated with generating the extra capacity.
Nevertheless, the results of Proposition 7 can be used to address the larger question of how much
capacity is appropriate, as well as how CBP might allocate capacity across ports.
Sample Capacity Calculation
Suppose that the SAT has the exponential form described in (2) and that the cost of capacity (per
unit of time) is linear: hκ. Then we can use the results in Proposition 4 to show that the principal’s
decision problem can be stated as minimizing the hourly rate of incurred cost:
min
κ {Λ(F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)εR + hκ} = min
κ {Λ(F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)e−κψR + hκ}.
Furthermore, it is not diﬃcult to verify that the objective function is strictly convex in κ, in which
case the ﬁrst-order conditions imply
κ∗ =
1
ψ
ln

ψλR
h

,
where λ = Λ(F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn). From the above expression it is straightforward to verify
that optimal capacity decreases with increasing capacity cost, h, and increases with increasing R.
The fact that C-TPAT membership, α∗
t = (θn − θm)w∆, is independent of port characteristics
– such as capacity, κ, and container arrival rate, Λ – also allows us to say something about the
problem of allocating capacity, or equivalently budget, across multiple ports. Assuming that the
risk proﬁles of trading ﬁrms (i.e., the distributions Gm and Gn) remain the same across ports, the
optimization problem faced by CBP is:
min
κ1,...,κn
"
(Fθm + (1 − F)θn)R
n X
i=1
Λiεi + h
n X
i=1
κi
#
subject to:
n X
i=1
κi ≤ κ (Budget)
κi ≥ κ0 i ∈ {1,...,n} (Min-Cap)
Suppose εi is (decreasing and) strictly convex in κi, as is also the case for (2). Then it is easy to
verify that the objective function is separable and strictly convex in each κi; hence, the objective
function is jointly convex in κi, for i ∈ {1,...,n}. Since the feasible region, as determined by the
budget and non-negativity constraints, is also convex, there exists a unique optimal solution. We
25consider two cases.
First, there may be enough money to achieve port-wise optimal capacity levels, i.e.,
n X
i=1
κ∗
i ≤ κ.
When εi = e−κiψi, we again have κ∗
i = 1
ψi ln
h
ψiλiR
h
i
, as determined for the single-port problem.
Second, we consider the more interesting case in which the budget constraint is tight. Assuming
that κ∗
i > κ0,∀i ∈ {1,...,n}, the FOC imply:
Λiψiεi = constant.
Using this result, along with the relationship
Pn
i=1 κi = κ, will give the unique optimal solution:
κ∗
i =
1
ψi
"
ln(Λiψi) −
P
i
1
ψi ln(Λiψi)
P
i
1
ψi
#
+
1
ψi P
i
1
ψi
κ.
For matters of national security, a precise determination of the “optimal” investment in capacity
involves a higher-level allocation of funds across critical assets such as sea ports, airports, nuclear
installations, etc. (GAO 2007-b). Hence, a rigorous treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
5.2 Risk Proﬁles of Non-Members and Members
Non-Members
There are at least two reasons to consider improvements in Gn: one, to reﬂect better practises on
the part of non-members, such as the use of electronic seals and RFID tags on containers; and two,
as the result of better intelligence on the part of CBP.
Improved intelligence can operate at two seemingly distinct levels. It can result in greater ability
to detect an intended attack. It can also manifest itself in greater ability to deter an intended attack.
We believe that the two are closely intertwined and do not distinguish between them. Therefore,
we assume that, with improved intelligence, the risk in a non-member’s environment reduces.
In both cases, the fact that Gm does not simultaneously change reﬂects an implicit assumption
that members already follow best practises and aﬀord CBP the best possible intelligence. If G0
n
is the distribution function for the risk proﬁle of non-members in an environment with reduced
exposure to risk, then Gn(·) >FOSD G0
n(·).
By an argument similar to the one in Lemma 1 we conclude that improved intelligence, or higher
26eﬃcacy of ATS, will result in an environment with lower risk for the non-members, which in turn
leads to a lower θn. We characterize the impact of a lower value of θn, as follows:
Proposition 8 An improvement in the risk proﬁle of non-member ﬁrms, or greater eﬃcacy of
ATS, results in lower membership for C-TPAT; i.e.,
dα∗
t
d(ATS)= −
dα∗
t
dθn ≤ 0.
Proof See Appendix B. 2
The intuition behind this result is that as, Gn improves to G0
n, θn decreases to θ0
n and the prospec-
tive beneﬁt (from reduced inspection) accruing to ﬁrms joining C-TPAT goes down. Hence, the
equilibrium membership level also goes down.
However, a safer environment doesn’t necessarily lead to greater overall security, ε∗. As long
as Gm >FOSD G0
n, the reduced security that follows a drop in membership can outweigh the
beneﬁt obtained through non-members’ improved risk proﬁles. The sign of dε∗
dθn is determined by
the dominant eﬀect. In particular, sgn

dε∗
dθn

= sgn[(1 − F(α∗
t)) − f(α∗
t)α∗
t].
Members
A downward correction in the estimate of the beneﬁt accrued from adhering to C-TPAT guidelines
may be interpreted as a degradation in the risk proﬁle of member ﬁrms, or higher θm. Then analysis
for members shows the following:
Proposition 9 A degradation in the risk proﬁle of member ﬁrms, or less than expected eﬃcacy of
C-TPAT guidelines, results in:
i) Lower membership for C-TPAT; i.e.,
dα∗
t
dθm ≤ 0.
ii) Lower level of security; i.e., dε∗
dθm ≥ 0.
Proof See Appendix B. 2
The intuition behind this result is that, when subjected to greater inspection frequency, or higher
θm, ﬁrms ﬁnd it less beneﬁcial to join C-TPAT. Thus, membership levels go down thereby increasing
the riskiness in the environment, or equivalently, resulting in lower security.
5.3 Deterrence Threshold
What would be the implications for port security, if terrorists’ cost of planning and executing an
attack changed? We address this question by noting that a change in the marginal cost of an attack
27(or CBP’s marginal cost of defense) results in a change in the deterrence threshold, L. We therefore
perform comparative statics on the optimal solution, with L as the changing parameter.
Until now we have assumed an FOSD ordering between the distributions Gn(x) and Gm(x).
However, for this analysis we assume the stronger condition of a monotone likelihood ratio (MLR)
ordering, i.e., gm(x)/gn(x) is decreasing in x (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994). The MLR property
implies that compliance with C-TPAT systematically reduces the distribution of risk across a given
company’s containers. MLR also implies a single crossing property for the pair of density functions
gm(x) and gn(x): there is a unique value of threat probability, η, such that gm(x)/gn(x) > 1 ∀x < η,
and gm(x)/gn(x) < 1 ∀x > η.
Proposition 10 For a monotone likelihood ratio ordering between Gn(x) and Gm(x), a higher
deterrence threshold L results in the following 2 cases:
i) For |dθm
dL | > |dθn
dL | (or equivalently L < η):
• Higher level of membership in C-TPAT:
dα∗
t
dL ≥ 0.
• Enhanced security: dε∗
dL ≤ 0.
ii) For |dθm
dL | ≤ |dθn
dL | (or equivalently L ≥ η) it results in a lower level of membership:
dα∗
t
dL ≤ 0
Proof See Appendix B. 2
An increase in the deterrence threshold results in a decrease in the fraction of containers inspected.
Therefore, the impact of an increase in the deterrence threshold on C-TPAT membership depends
on the relative sizes of the change in the fraction of containers inspected for members and non-
members. Proposition 10-(i) states that a higher deterrence threshold results in greater membership
of C-TPAT and an unambiguous improvement in overall security, as long as gm(L)/gn(L) > 1, or
L < η. Part (ii) of the proposition states that, for L ≥ η, we obtain a lower level of membership in
C-TPAT.
6 Discussion and Future Research
We have used a stylized model of port-security operations to obtain insights into the strategic
considerations of CBP and trading ﬁrms that participate in C-TPAT. Our analysis points out that
the program has its advantages: greater security and a Pareto improvement in costs for a given
level of capacity; membership and congestion levels that may remain stable across ports and over
28time. Thus, we see that, even though security mandates might seem to be the easiest way to bolster
homeland security, a creative use of economic mechanisms – ones that provide the right incentives
for private sector (and individual) participation in security initiatives – can yield important beneﬁts.
At the same time, it is important to remember that C-TPAT’s eﬀectiveness is critically dependent
on the improvement in risk proﬁle induced by the supply-chain practices included in the program, as
well as the eﬃcacy of ATS. Prospective changes on both of these fronts may lead to new operational
challenges and to new opportunities for analysis.
The GAO has come up with several recommendations to enhance ATS (GAO 2004, GAO 2006-
b). They include a recommendation to incorporate some random inspection of containers into the
inspection strategy. This would provide a means of evaluating the eﬀectiveness of ATS scoring by
providing a benchmark, and it would also deter terrorist attempts to game the system by learning
the ATS algorithm. An analysis of the optimal level of random inspection is a possible avenue for
future work.
From the trading ﬁrms’ point of view, the beneﬁts of joining C-TPAT must oﬀset the additional
investment required to comply with the security guidelines. In this paper we focused our attention
on the beneﬁt related to reduced inspection frequency.
The next level of beneﬁts pertains to a proposed tiered membership of C-TPAT. The highest
performing members of C-TPAT would be eligible to have access to an inspection-free shipping
process. This concept of expedited processing has been referred to as the “green lane” concept
(C-TPAT Strategic Plan 2004). However, implementation of this scheme is contingent on R&D
advances and successful roll-out of “smart” containers. Challenges remain, and it is yet to be
ascertained whether green lanes will ever become a reality (Downey 2006). Also on the horizon
is the beneﬁt associated with “restart priority” in the event of port closure due to a disaster. An
economic analysis of both of these beneﬁts present further opportunities for future work.
It is also worth noting that the idea of reduced inspections of trusted entities crossing US
borders is applicable to other domains besides port and cargo security. CBP has trusted traveler
programs (e.g., SENTRI, NEXUS) for frequent, low-risk border crossers. The program entitles
trusted travelers to expedited inspection at the ports of entry (SENTRI 2006). In an analogue to
the compliance cost trading ﬁrms incur when joining C-TPAT, these trusted travelers incur a dis-
utility from subjecting themselves to an extensive background check, a pre-requisite for enrollment
in the program.
Similar ideas may be applicable to international mail as well. Although the scope of CBP’s
mandate for inspections covers international mail (Wasem et al. 2004), it has not yet become a
29priority issue.
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32A Appendix: Proofs - Equilibrium Results
Proposition 1
Proof The principal’s optimization problem for the Base Case is:
min
εb
OP = min
εb
[θnεbR]
s.t.
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆ (IRb)
0 ≤ εb ≤ ε0. (FEASb)
The case ε∗
b = 0 will not arise as limεb→0 ψ(εb,κ) = ∞, and (IRb) will be violated. Also, the case
with ε∗
b = 1 and (IRb) not binding, cannot be optimal since the objective function can be improved
by reducing εb.
Using (3) and ψεb < 0 it is easy to verify that:
∂E(D)
∂εb
=
(1 − λψ)2λψ + λ2(ψ2 + σ2)
2(1 − λψ)2 ψεb < 0. (14)
Thus, the LHS of (IRb) is strictly decreasing in εb. The objective function is decreasing in εb,
therefore the optimal solution would make εb as small as possible, i.e., until one of the constraints
is binding. Hence, we conclude that the (IRb) constraint is binding at optimality. Thus, we have:
E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆,
which gives:
λψ2 − 2(1 + λ∆)ψ + (2∆ − λσ2) = 0.
Solving the above quadratic we get:
ψ(ε∗
b,κ) =
(1 + λ∆) −
p
1 + λ2(∆2 + σ2)
λ
We rule out the larger root of the quadratic as a candidate solution because it is larger than ∆, and
hence, infeasible. We note that for λσ2 ≤ 2∆, the optimal solution ψ(ε∗
b,κ) is always non-negative.
The assumption laid out in (5) ensures that εb = ε0 is a feasible solution. Since we have a
continuous function being optimized on a compact and non-empty feasible region, therefore an
optimal solution always exists. 2
Proposition 2
Proof At the threshold compliance cost αt, the condition in (7) is binding. Using α = (γi+qci(q))/ri
and w = di/ri in the binding version of (7), we get:
αt = (θn − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)) (15)
The LHS of the threshold condition is monotonically increasing (strictly) in αt. We claim that the
33right-hand side (RHS) is monotonically decreasing. This is because:
∂E(D)
∂αt
=
∂λ
∂αt

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

= −Λf(αt)(θn − θm)

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

≤ 0. (16)
This ensures that the equation has a unique solution, if it exists. To show existence, we observe
that when αt = 0, the RHS is some positive number - E(D) + ψ, where E(D) is evaluated with
λ = Λθn. Based on the described monotonicity in αt, and since αt ∈ [0,∞), a solution to the
equation must exist. Note that in case the compliance-costs have a ﬁnite upper bound, B, i.e.,
α ∈ [0,B], and it turns out that solving (9) results in αt > B, then using the obtained value of αt
for all subsequent calculations would be wlog since F(αt) = F(B) = 1. 2
Proposition 3
Proof The result follows from ensuring (IC) is satisﬁed for α = αt, and the assumption that
c0
i(q) ≥ 0. We claim that, for any ﬁxed ε, it is optimal for CBP to maximize participation in
C-TPAT. Speciﬁcally note that, once ε is ﬁxed, the only parameter in CBP’s objective function
that is not determined is αt. Furthermore, since θm < θn, maximizing αt minimizes expected costs.
Next we claim that for any ﬁxed ε, CBP can maximize αt by making q as small as possible.
In particular, recall from (9) that for ﬁxed ε, we have αt = (θn − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)), where
αt = (γt + qct(q))/rt for some i = t, although this index i may not be unique. Further, for all
α ≤ αt we obtain α = (γi + qci(q))/ri ≤ (γt + qct(q))/rt.
Now recall that c0
i(q) ≥ 0. Then if we reduce q we will also reduce α, for all α ≤ αt. Hence,
these companies continue to be members. Similarly, for α > αt, a decrease in q will reduce
α = (γi + qci(q))/ri, possibly permitting more ﬁrms’ α’s to fall below the original threshold αt.
Thus, membership is weakly increasing in q, so the value of q will be driven down till the (IC)
constraint is tight. At this point αt ≤ q(1 + β)αt, or q∗ = 1/(1 + β), which is independent of ε.
2
Proposition 4
Proof We state the principal’s optimization problem again.
min
ε OP = min
ε [(F(αt))θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)]εR
s.t.
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆ (IR)
0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0. (FEAS)
We begin by observing that a solution to the above optimization problem, and hence an equilib-
rium in the game between CBP and trading ﬁrms always exists. This is because the objective is to
optimize a continuous function over a compact space. The compact feasible region is non-empty.
Since κ ≥ κ0, it can easily be veriﬁed that ε = ε0 is always feasible.
Next we rule out the extreme solutions ε∗ = 0 and ε∗ = 1. The case ε∗ = 0 will not arise as
limε→0 ψ(ε,κ) = ∞, and (IR) will be violated. Also, the case with ε∗ = 1 and (IR) not binding,
cannot be optimal since the objective function can be improved by reducing ε.
To ﬁnd an optimal solution ε ∈ ()0,1), we use the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) on (9). We
34can rewrite (9) as:
φ(αt(ε),ε) = αt − (θn − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)) = 0
Since ε is a parameter in the above equation, then by IFT we have
dφ
dε = 0, which give us:
dφ
dε
= φαt
dαt
dε
+ φε =

1 − (θn − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂αt

dαt
dε
− (θn − θm)w

∂E(D)
∂ε
+ ψε

= 0
Rearranging the terms we obtain:
dαt
dε
=
(θn − θm)w
h
∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε
i
1 − (θn − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂αt
(17)
As in (14) in the proof of Proposition 1, we see that:
∂E(D)
∂ε
=
(1 − λψ)2λψ + λ2(ψ2 + σ2)
2(1 − λψ)2 ψε < 0 (18)
and as in (16) in the proof of Proposition 2, we have:
∂E(D)
∂αt
=
∂λ
∂αt

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

= −Λf(αt)(θn − θm)

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

≤ 0. (19)
Hence, we conclude that for any ε:
dαt
dε
< 0
and therefore:
dαt
dε∗ < 0. (20)
Substituting the value of αt(ε) from (9), we return to the principal’s optimization problem.
There are two possible cases; either we have an interior solution or the (IR) constraint is binding.
Case 1: An interior solution:
At optimum the FOC implies ∂OP
∂ε = 0 or,
∂
∂ε
{(F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)εR} =
(θm − θn)f(αt)εR
dαt
dε
+ (F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)R = 0
which gives us:
dαt
dε∗ =
(F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)R
f(αt)[(θn − θm)ε∗R]
≥ 0.
This is a contradiction with (20). Hence we cannot have an interior solution, and the (IR) con-
straint must be binding. This proves (i).
Case 2: The (IR) constraint is binding:
E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆.
35Using this in (9) we obtain:
α∗
t = (θn − θm)w∆.
Since the LHS of the (IR) constraint is monotonically decreasing in ε we can use the binding
constraint to determine the unique value of ψ(ε∗,κ). For λ = Λ[F(α∗
t)θm+(1−F(α∗
t))θn] we have:
λψ2 − 2(1 + λ∆)ψ + (2∆ − λσ2) = 0.
Solving the above quadratic we obtain:
ψ(ε∗,κ) =
(1 + λ∆) −
p
1 + λ2(∆2 + σ2)
λ
.
As in Proposition 1, we rule out the larger root of the quadratic as a candidate solution because
it is larger than ∆, and hence it is infeasible. We note that, for λσ2 ≤ 2∆, the optimal solution
ψ(ε∗,κ) is always non-negative. This proves (ii). The expression for ψ(ε∗,κ) in turn gives the
unique ε∗ for a given capacity level, κ, since ψε < 0. This completes the characterization of the
unique equilibrium outcome of the Stackelberg game. 2
Proposition 5
Proof First we show that ε∗
b ≥ ε∗. We know that (5) is satisﬁed with equality at equilibrium, in the
base case. Also using (13) we know that in both, the base case and under C-TPAT, the expression
for the optimal value of expected service time ψ is the same, but for the value of λ in the expression.
For the Base Case: λ = Λθn, while for the scenario with C-TPAT: λ = Λ[F(αt)θm+(1−F(αt))θn].
Since θm < θn, the λ under C-TPAT is weakly smaller than in the Base Case, and for αt > 0, it is
strictly smaller.
Next we show that ψ decreases in λ. Let’s assume the converse, i.e., ψ increases in λ. Then
if λ increases, so will ψ, and this implies E(D) will increase with λ and ψ, since σ2 is ﬁxed. But
E(D)+E(S) = ∆, a constant. So if λ increases, we cannot have both E(D) and ψ increase. Thus,
it must be the case that E(S) = ψ decreases in λ, i.e.,
dψ
dλ
≤ 0 (21)
and hence, E(D) = ∆ − ψ increases in λ.
Since we showed that λ is weakly smaller under C-TPAT as compared to the base case, we can
conclude that the value of ψ is higher for the scenario with C-TPAT, for a given level of capacity -
κ. Since ψε < 0, we conclude that ε∗ ≤ ε∗
b. This proves (i).
We now show that, under C-TPAT, both CBP’s and the trading ﬁrms’ costs decrease. The
change in optimal expected cost incurred by CBP can be evaluated as follows:
∆OP = OP(ε∗) − OP(ε∗
b) = [F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn]ε∗R − θnε∗
bR
or equivalently:
∆OP = F(αt)[−(θn − θm)ε∗R] + θn(ε∗ − ε∗
b)R.
This, together with the result in (i), gives us:
∆OP ≤ 0
36which means that, for a given level of capacity, κ, implementation of C-TPAT results in a lower
expected cost for CBP.
Recall from (7) that the expected cost of member ﬁrms is lower than that of non-members.
Dividing (7) by ri and recalling that α = (γi +q∗ci(q∗))/ri, we ﬁnd that, for the C-TPAT scenario,
the expected cost of member ﬁrms is: α + θmw(E(D∗) + E(S∗)) ≤ θnw(E(D∗) + E(S∗)) = θnw∆.
We also observe that the expected cost of non-member ﬁrms is θnw∆, and is unchanged from
the base case. Therefore we can conclude that implementation of C-TPAT (for a given level of
inspection capacity) results in a Pareto improvement of costs. This proves (ii).
Finally we show that congestion decreases under C-TPAT. Using Little’s Law we know that the
expression for expected number of containers in service or waiting in queue, ˆ L, at the secondary
inspection facility is:
ˆ L = λ(E(D) + E(S))
From part (i) we know that λ is lower under C-TPAT than the base case. We also know that
(E(D∗)+E(S∗)) = ∆ in both scenarios. Hence, the value of ˆ L is lower for the C-TPAT case. This
proves (iii). 2
Proposition 6
Proof From Proposition 2 we know that the threshold compliance cost as determined by (9) is
independent of the value of q. Hence, it remains the same for the First-Best scenario as well as
the scenario with C-TPAT in the presence moral hazard. Recall that the compliance-cost α =
(γi + q∗ci(q∗))/ri. In the First-Best scenario with no moral hazard there is no need for an audit
mechanism which eﬀectively lowers the compliance-cost of member ﬁrms to α ≡ γi/ri. Hence,
FFB(αt) ≥ F(αt). This proves (i).
Using the result in (i) along with (8) we conclude that eﬀective arrival rate is lower for the
First-Best scenario, i.e., λFB ≤ λ∗. Since the nature of CBP’s optimization is exactly the same in
both scenarios, it is easy to see that Proposition 4 characterizes the First-Best outcome as well,
though with F(·) ≡ FFB(·).
Using this observation in conjunction with (21), we conclude that ψFB ≥ ψ∗, or equivalently
εFB ≤ ε∗. This proves (ii).
We know that CBP’s objective function is
OP = [F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn]εR
Using the results in part (i) and (ii), it is easy to verify that OFB
P ≤ O∗
P. We note that the (IR)
constraint is binding in both scenarios thereby inducing identical congestion cost for trading ﬁrms.
Firms that are non-members in both scenarios therefore incur identical costs in the two cases.
Recall from (7) that the expected cost of member ﬁrms is lower than that of non-members.
Dividing (7) by ri and recalling that α = (γi + q∗ci(q∗))/ri, we ﬁnd that, for both scenarios,
the expected cost of member ﬁrms is: α + θmw(E(D∗) + E(S∗)) = α + θmw∆ ≤ θnw∆. Since
member ﬁrms incur a lower compliance-cost, α, in the First-Best scenario, we conclude that ﬁrms
that are members in both cases, are better-oﬀ in the First-Best setup. Using the observation
α + θmw∆ ≤ θnw∆ again, we conclude that ﬁrms that are members in the First-Best setup but
choose to become non-members in the scenario with moral hazard, are better-oﬀ in the former
scenario. This proves (iii). 2
37B Appendix: Proofs - Comparative Statics
In the proofs related to Comparative Statics we have, for convenience, suppressed any notational
indication of optimality, i.e., we don’t use ‘∗’ to signify optimality.
Proposition 7
Proof From Propositions 2 and 4, we have the following relationships at equilibrium:
φ1 = αt − (θn − θm)w∆ = 0;and (22)
φ2 = ∆ − E(D) − ψ = 0. (23)
Using (22) it is straightforward to verify that:
dαt
dκ
= 0
This proves (i). Using Implicit Function Theorem on (23) we obtain:
dφ2
dκ
= 0 =⇒
∂φ2
∂ε
dε
dκ
+
∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dκ
+
∂φ2
∂κ
=
∂φ2
∂ε
dε
dκ
+
∂φ2
∂κ
= 0,
which gives us:
dε
dκ
=

∂E(D)
∂κ + ψκ

−

∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε
.
To determine the sign of the above expression observe that
∂E(D)
∂κ
=
∂E(D)
∂ψ
ψκ =

2λψ(1 − λψ) + λ2σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

ψκ ≤ 0.
From (18) we know that
∂E(D)
∂ε < 0. Hence, we see that
dε
dκ
≤ 0.
This proves (ii). The expression for the expected cost of the principal is:
OP = (F(αt)θm + (1 − F(αt))θn)εR.
Since αt does not change, while ε decreases with increasing capacity, we conclude:
dOP
dκ
≤ 0.
This proves (iii). 2
Proposition 8
Proof As in the proof of Proposition 7, we use (22) and Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) to obtain:
dφ1
dθn
= 0 =⇒
∂φ1
∂ε
dε
dθn
+
∂φ1
∂αt
dαt
dθn
+
∂φ1
∂θn
= 0.
38Since
∂φ1
∂ε = 0 and
∂φ1
∂αt = 1, we have:
dαt
dθn
= w∆ ≥ 0,
which proves the desired result. Using (23) and IFT we obtain
dφ2
dθn
= 0 =⇒
∂φ2
∂ε
dε
dθn
+
∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dθn
+
∂φ2
∂θn
= 0,
which gives us:
dε
dθn
= −
∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dθn +
∂φ2
∂θn
∂φ2
∂ε
. (24)
In (18) and (19), we have shown that
∂E(D)
∂ε ≤ 0 and
∂E(D)
∂αt ≤ 0, which implies that
∂φ2
∂ε =
−

∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε

≥ 0 and
∂φ2
∂αt = −
∂E(D)
∂αt ≥ 0. Also note that:
∂E(D)
∂θn
=
∂λ
∂θn

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

= Λ(1 − F(αt))

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

≥ 0. (25)
Now substituting these three terms into (24) we have:
dε
dθn
=

∂E(D)
∂αt w∆ +
∂E(D)
∂θn

−

∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε
 .
We see that the sign of dε
dθn is determined by the sign of the numerator of the RHS above. Using
the expression in (19), we determine that:
sgn

dε
dθn

= sgn[(1 − F(αt)) − f(αt)αt]
2
Proposition 9
Proof As in the proof of Proposition 7, we use (22) and Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) to get:
dφ1
dθm
= 0 =⇒
∂φ1
∂ε
dε
dθm
+
∂φ1
∂αt
dαt
dθm
+
∂φ1
∂θm
= 0,
which gives us:
dαt
dθm
=
−

∂φ1
∂ε
dε
dθm +
∂φ1
∂θm

∂φ1
∂αt
Since
∂φ1
∂ε = 0 and
∂φ1
∂αt = 1, we obtain:
dαt
dθm
= −w∆ ≤ 0,
which proves (i).
39Using (23) and IFT we have:
dφ2
dθm
= 0 =⇒
∂φ2
∂ε
dε
dθm
+
∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dθm
+
∂φ2
∂θm
= 0,
which gives us:
dε
dθm
=
−

∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dθm +
∂φ2
∂θm

∂φ2
∂ε
.
Again, from (18) and (19) we know that
∂E(D)
∂ε ≤ 0 and
∂E(D)
∂αt ≤ 0, which implies that
∂φ2
∂ε =
−

∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε

≥ 0 and
∂φ2
∂αt = −
∂E(D)
∂αt ≥ 0. Also note that
∂E(D)
∂θm
=
∂λ
∂θm

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

= ΛF(αt)

ψ2 + σ2
2(1 − λψ)2

≥ 0. (26)
We therefore have:
dε
dθm
=

−
∂E(D)
∂αt w∆ +
∂E(D)
∂θn

−

∂E(D)
∂ε + ψε
 ≥ 0,
which proves (ii). 2
Proposition 10
Proof As in the proof of Proposition 7, we use (22) and Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) to obtain:
dφ1
dL
= 0 =⇒
∂φ1
∂θn
dθn
dL
+
∂φ1
∂θm
dθm
dL
+
∂φ1
∂ε
dε
dL
+
∂φ1
∂αt
dαt
dL
+
∂φ1
∂L
= 0.
But
∂φ1
∂L = 0,
∂φ1
∂ε = 0, and
∂φ1
∂αt = 1. Together with
∂φ1
∂θn = w∆ and
∂φ1
∂θm = −w∆, this implies:
w∆
dθn
dL
− w∆
dθm
dL
+
dαt
dL
= 0.
Recall that θn = 1 − Gn(L) and θm = 1 − Gm(L). Therefore we have:
dαt
dL
= w∆(gm(L) − gn(L)). (27)
Since Gn(x) and Gm(x) are related by an MLR ordering, as described in Section 5.3, if L is less
than η, then gm(L) > gn(L) and therefore dαt
dL ≥ 0.
Using (23) and IFT we get:
dφ2
dL
= 0 =⇒
∂φ2
∂θn
dθn
dL
+
∂φ2
∂θm
dθm
dL
+
∂φ2
∂ε
dε
dL
+
∂φ2
∂αt
dαt
dL
+
∂φ2
∂L
= 0.
Since
∂φ2
∂L = 0 and
∂φ2
∂αt = 1, we have:
dε
dL
=
∂E(D)
∂αt
dαt
dL −
∂E(D)
∂θn gn(L) −
∂E(D)
∂θm gm(L)
−
∂E(D)
∂ε
.
40Recall from (18), (19), (25), and (26) that
∂E(D)
∂ε < 0,
∂E(D)
∂αt ≤ 0,
∂E(D)
∂θn ≥ 0, and
∂E(D)
∂θm ≥ 0.
Hence, for L < η, it is easy to verify that:
dε
dL
≤ 0.
This proves (i). If L ≥ η, then gm(L) ≤ gn(L), and using (27) we conclude that dαt
dL ≤ 0. This
proves (ii). 2
41C Appendix: Heterogeneous Risk Proﬁle for Non-Members
In the treatment presented in the main body of the paper, non-members had the same risk proﬁle,
characterized by the distribution Gn. We now relax this assumption and solve our model for two
types of risk proﬁles for non-members: l for low risk, and h for high risk, with corresponding
distributions Gnl and Gnh. At the end of this section we further generalize our solution approach
to allow for n types.
We assume that prior to introducing C-TPAT, a fraction sl of the total containers were from l
type ﬁrms, while a fraction sh were from h type ﬁrms, such that sl + sh = 1.
We deﬁne the compliance-cost of non-members of type l as αl, with corresponding distribution
and density functions Fl(αl) and fl(αl). We also introduce analogous notation for type h of non-
members. We assume that after complying with the guidelines of C-TPAT, both types will be
transformed to the members’ risk proﬁle, Gm.
Next we assume an FOSD order relationship between Gnl and Gnh; i.e., Gnl(x) > Gnh(x),∀x ∈
[0,1). Also, as before, we assume an FOSD order relationship between Gnl and Gm; i.e., Gm(x) >
Gnl(x),∀x ∈ [0,1).
Then, by an argument similar to that in Proposition 1, we conclude that:
θm < θnl < θnh.
Similar to (9), we now have two threshold conditions to be satisﬁed:
αlt = (θnl − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)), (28)
αht = (θnh − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)). (29)
Also
λ = Λ[sl(1 − Fl(αlt))θnl + sh(1 − Fl(αht))θnh + (slFl(αlt) + shFh(αht))θm]. (30)
For the purpose of this analysis we set β = 1 in (IC) to yield to constraints (IC l) and (IC h) for
each category of non-members. The optimization problem faced by CBP is:
min
ε,ql,qh
OP = min
ε,ql,qh
{[(slFl + shFh)θm + sl(1 − Fl)θnl + sh(1 − Fh)θnh]εR}
s.t.
αl ≤ 2qlαlt, ∀αl ≤ αlt (IC l)
αh ≤ 2qhαht, ∀αh ≤ αht (IC h)
E(D) + E(S) ≤ ∆ (IR)
0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0, 0 ≤ ql,qh ≤ 1. (FEAS)
42Proposition 11 The Stackelberg game between CBP and the trading ﬁrms results in a unique pure
strategy equilibrium such that:
i) q∗
h = q∗
l = 0.5,
ii) E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆,
iii) α∗
ht = (θnh − θm)w∆; α∗
lt = (θnl − θm)w∆; α∗
ht > α∗
lt.
Proof By an argument similar to that presented in the proof of Proposition 3, it is easy to see that
q∗
l = q∗
h = 0.5. This proves (i). For τ ∈ {l,h}, we deﬁne the following using (28) and (29):
φτ(ατt,ατ0t,ε) = ατt − (θnτ − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)) = 0.
Using Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) on the above relationship, we obtain:
dφτ
dε
= 0 =⇒
∂φτ
∂ατt
dατt
dε
+
∂φτ
∂ατ0t
dατ0t
dε
+
∂φτ
∂ε
= 0,
which gives us

1 − (θnτ − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂ατt

dατt
dε
−

(θnτ − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂ατ0t

dατ0t
dε
= (θnτ−θm)w

∂E(D)
∂ε
+ ψε

. (31)
We can verify that for τ ∈ {l,h}:
∂E(D)
∂ατt ≤ 0, and
∂E(D)
∂ε ≤ 0. Then the RHS above is negative.
Re-arranging the terms in (31) we obtain:

∂E(D)
∂ατt
dατt
dε
+
∂E(D)
∂ατ0t
dατ0t
dε

=
1
w(θnτ − θm)
dατt
dε
−
∂E(D)
∂ε
− ψε, (32)
which gives us
1
θnl − θm
dαlt
dε
=
1
θnh − θm
dαht
dε
. (33)
From the above relationship we conclude that
dαlt
dε and
dαht
dε are of the same sign. This, along with
equation (31), implies that:
dαlt
dε
≤ 0;
dαht
dε
≤ 0.
If at optimum, none of the constraints is binding then we have an interior solution w.r.t. ε, for
which the following condition must be satisﬁed:
∂OP
∂ε
= slfl[(θm − θnl)εR]
dαlt
dε
+ shfh[(θm − θnh)εR]
dαht
dε
+ [(slFl + shFh)θm + sl(1 − Fl)θnl + sh(1 − Fh)θnh]R = 0.
Since using IFT we had shown that
dαlt
dε ≤ 0 and
dαht
dε ≤ 0, the above equation leads to a contra-
diction.
Hence, one of the constraints is binding at optimum. Since we can rule out ε = 0 by reasoning
similar to that presented in the proof of Proposition 4, we conclude that (IR) is binding; i.e.,
E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆.
43This proves (ii). Then using this result, (28), and (29) we get the expressions for α∗
ht and α∗
lt. Since
θnh > θnl, we also conclude that α∗
ht > α∗
lt. This proves (iii). 2
Generalization to n types
We now allow for n types of risk proﬁles for the non-members. Each type is represented as τi, for
i ∈ {1,2,...,n}. Without loss of generality (wlog) we assume that type 1 is the most risky. A higher
index on the type implies a lower risk level. Once again, assuming an FOSD ordering relationship
between the distributions Gτi, we ﬁnd that the following set of relationships hold at equilibrium:
θnτi > θnτi−1 > θm, i ∈ {2,...,n}
qτi = 0.5, i ∈ {1,2,...,n}
φτi(ατit,ατ−it,ε) = ατit − (θnτi − θm)w(E(D) + E(S)) = 0, i ∈ {1,2,...,n}.
where τ−i represents the set {τ1,τ2,...,τi−1,τi+1,...,τn}. Using IFT on the set of equations repre-
sented by φτi, we get the analogue of equation (31):

1 − (θnτi − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂ατit

dατit
dε
−
n X
k=1,k6=i

(θnτi − θm)w
∂E(D)
∂ατkt

dατkt
dε
= (θnτi−θm)w

∂E(D)
∂ε
+ ψε

.
(34)
Re-arranging the terms we obtain:
"
n X
i=1
∂E(D)
∂ατit
dατit
dε
#
=
1
w(θnτi − θm)
dατit
dε
−
∂E(D)
∂ε
− ψε. (35)
The above two equations imply that for all i:
dατit
dε ≤ 0. For an interior solution w.r.t. ε, the
following condition must be satisﬁed:
∂OP
∂ε
=
n X
i=1
sτifτi[(θm − θnτi)εR]
dατit
dε
+
n X
i=1
[sτiFτiθm + sτi(1 − Fτi)θnτi]R = 0.
Since using IFT we had shown that
dατit
dε ≤ 0, the above equation leads to a contradiction.
Hence, one of the constraints is binding at optimum. We conclude that (IR) is binding; i.e.,
E(D∗) + E(S∗) = ∆.
44